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The Good Life and the Bad: Dialectics of Solidarity1 
Shirin M Rai, University of Warwick 
 
Abstract: Building on the feminist endeavour of analysing the personal and political 
within the same frame, this essay asks four questions about the good life. First, what 
place recognition of exclusion has in the politics of redistribution? Second, what is the 
political spatiality – can we imagine a public good life without also paying attention 
to the private and how does the private leach into the public imagination of a good 
life? Third, what secures the good life – what obligations of justice to fellow human 
beings do we have to ensure our shared good lives? And finally, is good life a life of 
solidarity – can we imagine new ways of thinking about resistance and change 
through alliances of the excluded?  I argue that the imagination of a good life has to 
be contextual, it is gendered and it is solidaristic. 
 
Key words: good life, recognition, redistribution, solidarity  
                                                 
1 I would like to thank the following for thoughtful, challenging and supportive comments on this 
paper: Molly Andrews, Matthew Clayton, Mary Hawkesworth, Rianne Mahon, Jeremy Roche, 
Matthew Watson and two anonymous referees for Social Politics. The limitations of this paper are 
mine alone.  
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“The most tragic form of loss isn't the loss of security; it's the loss of the capacity to 
imagine that things could be different.” 
― Ernst Bloch 
 
I have often wanted to imagine a feminist utopia in my writing, but in a time of pain 
and fear that surrounds us at this historical moment this work seems more urgent; it is 
a time of right-wing populism; of a politics of hate as well as a politics of hope in both 
the global north and south. The context of this populist turn is in part the inequalities 
of global capitalism, of a colonial hangover of racialised exclusions and the collapse 
of progressive solidarities. As the lives of so many are destroyed by war, as thousands 
leave their homes in rickety, leaky boats to make hazardous journeys across the 
Mediterranean to seek the good life elsewhere, it is a moment to pause and reflect 
what a good life is and might be. And yet, the images of refugees on our television 
screens generate narratives of fear and of otherness that allows for building of 
alliances against a hospitable society; in the words of the poet CP Cavafy: 
Because night has fallen and the barbarians have not come. 
             And some who have just returned from the border say 
             there are no barbarians any longer.   
 And now, what’s going to happen to us without barbarians? 
They were, those people, a kind of solution. 
(Waiting for the Barbarians) 
This fear of the ‘barbarians’ that are not there, then poses another set of questions: in 
holding ‘them’ off, containing them, rejecting them do we erode ourselves, our own 
imaginaries of the good life? In welcoming them, helping them, working with them, 
might we build an inclusive world that holds us and them together in a shared good 
life? The question that Adorno posed in Minima Moralia is crucial here – how does 
one lead ‘a good life in a bad life’? Or in Judith Butler’s words, is it possible ‘to live 
one’s own life well, such that we might say that we are living a good life within a 
world in which the good life is structurally or systematically foreclosed for so many’ 
(2012)? Can exploitation, inequality, discrimination, violence and other forms of 
effacement co-exist with the idea, the imaginary and the politics of the good life?  
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What is ‘good’ about the good life varies – lives are lived in different registers, with 
different levels of tolerance of difference and violence, measures of success and 
failure, production and reproduction, boundaries of safety and security. So, can we 
think about a good life without thinking about whose life that is? It is, after all, rooted 
in particular landscapes and histories - the horizon that we look to is shaped by the 
place where we stand.  
 
Growing up in pre-liberalised India in a family of academics who were anti-religion, 
left-wing and socially liberal, I lived a good life in a country that was poor in some 
ways but very rich in its history and its political life. I was not denied life, as many 
girls are in rural India (see Sen,1990); rather my birth was celebrated – with joyous 
telegrams going to family and friends; I was sent to the best schools and university, 
supported at every step in my education and in my professional ambitions. I was 
brought up with social values that undermined caste and gender as categories of 
discrimination, where equality among all was espoused and indeed campaigned for. 
And the world was brought home – through books, travellers that my father bumped 
into in his long walks, through campaigners for political causes – gender 
mobilisations against violence against women; peace activism - the anti-Vietnam war, 
pro-Palestine campaigns; visitations from foreign academics who passed through 
Delhi university (I remember as a child of 8 years sitting on the knee of Andre Gunder 
Frank as he talked with my father). It was a good life – for me, for a middle class girl 
in India, and I could even claim that for a girl anywhere in the world.  
 
A good life until for a mere two years it was taken away in unexpected and brutal 
ways – the suspension of civil rights of Indian citizens under the Emergency that was 
declared by Mrs Gandhi in 1975. It was then that I saw what Arendt has called the 
banality of evil (1977) take hold in our lives – when I saw my parents worry about 
their safety and that of the family, when thousands went to jail, when many thousands 
were dislocated in the name of aestheticizing the city and whose selfhood was 
attacked through officially sanctioned forced sterilization programmes in the name of 
‘family planning’. Fear has no place in a good life – I learnt that early and also learnt 
the euphoria of overthrowing tyranny as millions mobilized against the Emergency. 
The good life then was re-made for at least the middle classes in India in 1977 – with 
the electoral defeat of Mrs Gandhi and the emergence of many different political 
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parties on the Indian landscape. This change alerted us that visions of the good life – a 
democratic, non-violent life - cannot be taken for granted; rather they can spur us on 
to action in concert with others, to change the world we live in. I remember well the 
jubilant crowds on the streets of Delhi when the election results started rolling in – a 
collective weight was lifted off the chests of the citizens; we cried, we danced, we 
hugged strangers as we celebrated together. The form that this change takes might be 
different, but working with others to bring about transformation of our worlds for the 
better is something that we can aspire to. And yet, recently at Jawaharlal University, 
where I was a Visiting Professorial Fellow –the ghost of the Emergency was again felt 
walking the campus. In the name of anti-nationalism, police were sent on campus, 
students were arrested and a vicious campaign against the university and progressive 
politics was launched. The appropriation of nationalism in the narrowest of registers 
by the right-wing BJP poses a new challenge to the country and its democratic and 
secular ethos today. But as during the first Emergency, this in itself has elicited a 
response that has brought many strands of politics and many groups of citizens 
together against this government’s oppressive modalities of governance. My Civics 
teachers in high school used to intone in class, ‘eternal vigilance is the price of 
liberty’2 – the good life is under threat from many directions and needs vigilant 
citizens to protect it.  
 
However, this discourse of eternal vigilance has largely attached itself to the political 
sites of governance, not to the everyday domestic sites of governance. My good life as 
a girl in growing up in Delhi also depended on living in a cocoon – of being ferried 
from place to place by either my parents or school transportation; unattended entry 
into the public space – walking to and from the market, for example – could elicit 
sexual harassment. For many women, entering the public space can mean and an 
experience of violence, as the 2012 rape of a young woman on a Delhi bus, which 
mobilised thousands to protest against violence against women reminded us3. 
Violence also marks private spaces – domestic and partner violence continues to mar 
                                                 
2 From a speech made by the American abolitionist and liberal activist Wendell Phillips on January 28, 
1852. 
3 See Pratiksha Baxi, 2012, Rape Cultures in India, https://kafila.online/2012/12/23/rape-cultures-in-
india-pratiksha-baxi/    
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the lives of women4. In the 1980s women mobilized in India against state violence -
the Mathura rape in custody became the trigger (Baxi et al 1979) as well as violence 
by the marital family (dowry murders). Both elicited huge demonstrations against the 
perpetrators and against the state’s neglect in bringing them to justice. In the 1990s, 
when I had already left India for the UK, the liberalization of the economy and the 
experience of globalization became the important filter through which the good life 
came to be imagined – mass poverty had not been eradicated through a state 
dominated, inefficient capitalism; globalized capital’s shining lights beckoned 
(Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2014). Even as we celebrate India as a new power on the 
rise, the economic indicators provide a very mixed picture and in certain areas (Kohli, 
2012) – such as violence against women (Kannabiran, 2007) – they are particularly 
troubling.  
 
The good life then was and remains fragile both in the public and the private spheres 
of life. What is clear is that for it to be a good life its conception needs not only a 
focus on democratic rights of citizens, but also on the conditions that embed these; not 
only the formal public political rights but also the informal social norms of equality 
and dignity that ensure a good life in private spaces. The imaginary of good life thus 
needs to bridge the public and the private spheres (a long standing feminist position) 
and also individual and collective lives – the good life needs to be a shared good life.  
So, maybe the question we need to ask ourselves is not what is ‘the good life’, but 
what work does the idea of the good life perform in our social, political and personal 
milieus? 
 
However fragile, the value of alternative imaginings is also important to recognise. 
First, without reimaginings we could become complicit in the reproduction of the 
dominant norms and values, our unjust worlds. Unless we are able to challenge the 
lives we live through reimagining it, we are also not able to make judgements about 
right and wrong, good and bad, about how we can live a good life when so much is 
bad around us. Contemporary work on feminist utopias (Cooper, 2014; Gornick and 
                                                 
4 From 50,703 in 2003, the number of reported cases has gone up to 118,866 in 2013 - an increase of 
134% over 10 years, far out-stripping the rise in population over the same period. This is in part 
because of increased reporting of domestic violence, since the passing of the Domestic Violence Act in 
2005. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-29708612 See also, 
http://ncrb.nic.in/StatPublications/CII/CII2015/chapters/Chapter%205-15.11.16.pdf) 
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Meyers, 2009) may be one such way of reimagining life but needs to be situated in the 
unequal worlds that we occupy (Hassim, 2009). Second, utopia reassures us that 
‘another world is possible’ – that there are (different) routes out of our individual or 
collective conditions as they are out of them. As the Buddha learnt, behind the curtain 
of happiness drawn around him by his adoring parents, lay a world that was marked 
by pain, illness and death, as well as education, meditation and renunciation. For the 
Buddha, a happy world was one where everyone followed the Dharma – the laws of 
social good – and where this ‘right path’ led to Nirvana, or the freedom from the cycle 
of rebirth. Being good then, was for Buddhists, the good life. This led Ambedkar – 
Chair of the Indian Constituent Assembly and leader of India’s Dalits – to urge Dalits 
to leave their oppressive existence within Hinduism for the more equal spaces of 
Buddhism (2014). Even though this strategy of ‘moving out’ did not produce the 
results Ambedkar hoped for, it allowed for conversations about the place of Dalits in 
Indian (not just Hindu) society. Third, imagining another world also makes us 
struggle over resources we might need to bring it into being. Rights to material goods 
as well as public political good, individual as well as collective, capabilities that are 
honed and those that wither, are all to be struggled over for a fairer distribution of 
these resources that can underpin the good life. Transforming gender relations for 
example needs a historical analysis of imperialism that allows for continued 
expropriation of care labour of women in the global south to plug the care gaps in the 
global north (Hassim, 2009), it also needs an analysis of the subsidy that care work in 
the home – unrecognised and therefore unrecompensed – pays to global capitalism, 
and it needs to address how institutional intervention, while important are not 
sufficient unless we transform the gendered division of labour in the home (Rai et al, 
2014). Fourth, an alternative imaginary provides us with a sense of belonging, and of 
solidarity. If being good was the path to a good life in Buddhist philosophy, in 
western philosophy, participation in public life was the route to a good life. This is 
because the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by 
chance but through exercising reason in the service of the city-state which exists for 
the sake of the good life (Miller, 2017). The life of a citizen in the city state was for 
Aristotle the life that was fulfilled: it involved activity as well as moral habits, 
exhibiting virtue in accordance with reason. It also involved the solidarity of 
mobilizing to protect the city and its inhabitants; the militarized and masculine 
citizenship/solidarity. Those outside of this life - the slaves and women – were not 
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thus fulfilled, however. Expanding solidarities – of the marginalised, of students and 
workers - also provide alternate visions of belonging, of redistribution of resources, 
power and social roles. 
 
Here, I argue that although utopias have value they are ever bounded by histories and 
geographies of inclusion and exclusion (Chowdhury and Rai, 2009). And further, that 
contemporary imaginaries are often articulated in narrow registers rather than the 
expansive ones that Hannah Arendt attributed to Walter Benjamin:  
He was concerned with the correlation between a street scene, a speculation on 
the stock exchange, a poem, a thought, with the hidden line which holds them 
together and enables the historian or philologist to recognize that they must all 
be placed in the same period (1968:11).  
It is such associations I suggest, across the boundaries of disciplines and the public 
and the private that can help us think through the good life. 
 
Four tropes emerge: first, the place recognition of exclusion has in the politics of 
redistribution outlined in the debates between Fraser (1995) and Butler (1997) and 
Fraser and Honeth (2003). Second, is about the spatiality of the good life – holding 
the public and the private together in the same frame. Third concerns what secures the 
good life – what obligations of justice to fellow citizens ensure our shared good lives. 
And finally, the fourth, situates the good life as a life of solidarity – requiring us to 
imagine new ways of thinking about resistance and change through alliances of the 
excluded.   
 
I 
Whose Good Life? 
At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb, 
there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of 
crimes committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to 
him[sic]. It is this above all that is sacred in every human being’ (Simone Weil, 
2005:71).  
 
When we think of the good life, whose life are we thinking of and who is the agent of 
change? Most of liberal philosophy in some ways puts forward the idea of the 
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universalisable good life.  The idea of the good life permeates most of our political 
thinking. Liberal theory has largely focused on individual rights rather than social life; 
the resources available, garnered and invested by individuals towards the 
improvement of their lives is different from a more structuralist approach to a good 
life. While for Adam Smith social happiness is the effect of naturally arising morality, 
for Marx individual happiness is the result of socially arising solidarity. 
 
Now, of course, feminist theorists have long critiqued this universalist impulse in 
political theory as privileging the male norm – Carole Pateman for example critiqued 
the social contract as the sexual contract. Feminist scholars have also challenged the 
social separation upon which this norm is constructed – the private and the public – 
arguing that the absence of insecurity and violence in both the private and the public 
spheres must surely be part of our conceptualization about the good life. Further, there 
have been struggles over how the emplacement of gendered individuals matters 
within the context of state formations. The anthropologist Schepper-Hughes, for 
example, points to how deep injustices of political and economic inequality are 
manifested in women’s emotional responses to child bearing, rearing and mortality 
(specifically, in poor women’s acceptance of their children’s death) (1992: 341). And 
the sociologist Arjun Appadurai alerts us to the ways in which the capacity to aspire is 
itself located in our everyday exclusions (2004). So, imagining a good life can also be 
a marker of a struggle to give voice to aspirations and visions of a different, better 
life. The location also of individuals within particular states also has effect on 
imaginaries of the good life. As Hassim has pointed out, ‘utopian proposals…are not 
viable without radical changes in the economic and institutional landscape’ of 
countries of the global south (2009:94. From early discussions of the exclusion of 
women from the public space and incarceration in the private (Engels, 1884) to the 
work on how the state has been mobilised into stabilising these carceral relations of 
domesticity (Barratt, 2014), to their particular and unequal inclusion in the productive 
spaces of international political economy (Mies, 1999; Elson and Pearson, 1984), 
feminist and post-colonial work has vigorously challenged the discourse of the 
universality of the human, and hence of a human good life. It is instructive to think 
through these debates to understand the pull of a good life as a concept and as a goal 
that we all in different ways strive for.   
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As a political economist, however, I do think that the good life needs tethering in 
social conditions and relations, which is where issues of (mis)recognition and 
(mal)redistribution become important. Nancy Fraser (1995) and Judith Butler (1997) 
have argued over the nature of capitalism, the injustices of distribution and injustices 
of recognition. Butler was insistent that Fraser’s perspectival dualism allowed issues 
of recognition to be trumped by those of economic distribution. While Fraser insisted 
that within her framework, status-order injuries as well as maldistribution injuries 
often go together, the underlying message of her formulation was seen to be that the 
economic structure and the status order are not the same; that redistributive politics 
addresses the economic structure and the recognition politics addresses issues of 
identity, which are important but not reducible to structure. What I posit is that the 
recognition of exclusion has an important place in the politics of redistribution; that 
indeed the two are imbricated.  Recognition is critically important to our sense of 
well-being: both as individual subjects and as part of a social life where cruelties of 
misrecognition are minimised. Recognition is also important for us to think through 
what needs to be put in place for the enhancement, not just survival, of our lives.   
 
II 
The Spaces of Good Life 
We the women  
We the women who toil unadorn 
Heads tie with cheap cotton 
We the women who cut 
Clear fetch dig sing 
We the women making  
something from this  
ache-and-pain-a-me 
back-o-hardness 
Yet we the women 
Whose praises go unsung  
Whose voices go unheard 
Whose deaths they sweep 
Aside 
As easy as dead leaves 
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(Grace Nichols; I is a Long Memoried;  1990, London, Karnak House) 
 
Thinking about recognition and redistribution always reminds me of a story my father 
told me: he was a great walker and loved to walk in the mountains. We visited Shimla 
every summer, the hill station which had also been the summer capital of the British. 
One day my father came back from his usual morning walk rather subdued. This is 
what he related: 
I have been taught a lesson today. I was sitting on the roadside bollards and 
admiring the mountains when a coolie came and rested beside me. I turned to 
him and asked him ‘Aren’t you a lucky man to live in Shimla? You have these 
mountains as companions all the time, while I will be going home to hot and 
busy Delhi soon. He looked at me and said ‘Sahib, when do I have the time to 
lift up my head to see the mountains? I am a coolie; I always look down to 
make sure I don’t stumble’’.  
My father’s anger with himself was about his narrow understanding of beauty and 
who is able to reflect upon it. He wanted me to remember this story; I always have. 
Perhaps because of this, in my work, I too have been a bit of what Sara Ahmed calls a 
feminist ‘killjoy’ – not raising my eyes to view the beauty of the mountain summit 
(the good life), but doggedly grappling with issues of inclusion and the terms of 
inclusion, of labour and its framing, and of violence and its effects (the bad life).  
So, my understanding of the good life has really built on attempting to understand its 
other – the unhappy, exploited, excluded life. Can an alienated life teach us more 
about what we visualize as the good, the happy and enriched life? While I agree with 
Ahmed when she notes that ‘Explanations of relative unhappiness can function to 
restore the power of an image of the good life in the form of nostalgia or regret for 
what has been lost (2010:52)’, I suggest that debates on relative unhappiness can also 
spur us on to action to move towards a shared good life. 
 
Much of my recent work has been on the non-recognition of domestic work – in 
society, by the state and through regulatory mechanisms such as the System of 
National Accounts that calculates our GDP.  Marilyn Waring, who is herself a 
statistician and who worked for the UN has this to say about the later:  
“When you are seeking out the most vicious tools of colonization, those that 
can obliterate a culture and a nation, a tribe or a people’s value system, then 
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rank the UNSNA [United Nation System of National Accounts] among those 
tools” (1988:49).  
This lack of recognition of domestic labour means that we cannot capture the 
everyday ‘mess, pain, pleasure and pressure of everyday life’ (Pettman 2003: 158). 
Trying to gauge the costs of this non-recognition I have, with my colleagues, analysed 
the consequences of non-recognition as mal-distribution by developing the concept of 
depletion through social reproduction (Rai et al 2014). The argument is as follows: we 
all crave recognition of the work we do and without this we feel personally and 
socially unvalued. Unpaid domestic work remains deeply gendered, which means that 
this unrecognised work continues to be largely done by women. While it is important 
to acknowledge that many women/carers feel that they gain from enacting their roles, 
while different locations affect what systems of support they are able to access to 
inform their choices, I would suggest that without recognition of their contribution to 
society, which we call depletion through social reproduction, most of us will be 
harmed. This harm takes many forms: to individuals (adversely affecting their 
physical and mental health), to households (adversely affecting the relationships and 
material fabric of the home) and to the community (through erosion of public spaces 
accessed by all as well as of solidaristic relations). It also harms by generating a very 
different politics of citizenship where those not recognised as workers (in the home) 
are also not recognised as citizens with entitlements against the state; rather they are 
constructed as recipients of welfare.  Such depleted lives cannot be good lives.  
 
The principle of visualising the good life through critiquing a bad life is an important 
one. Without joining the spaces of the domestic/private and the public we are only 
thinking about half of a good life. By posing the question ‘whose good life’ we can 
bring into light the hidden corners of the everyday where inequalities are reproduced 
and through which the good life of some is dependent upon the bad life of the many.  
 
III 
Routes to the Good Life 
To imagine a good life in its complexities, is also to think about how we can bring 
about the good life; searching for a utopia means also searching for the paths that lead 
to it.  
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Here again we find routes that are individual and ones that are more solidaristic. 
Viewing the individual as the object and the agent of the visualization of a good life 
has a long history. In 5th century BCE Hindu philosophy the good life is attained in 
two ways – one by living through as well as one can, the four stages or ashramas of 
the life of a man: Brahmacharya or the Student Stage which focused on study and 
celibacy, Grihastha or the Householder Stage – when the head of household attained 
the means to provide for his family – wealth as well as values, Vanaprastha or the 
Hermit Stage, the stage of retirement and passing on the responsibilities of the family 
to the son and Sannyasa or the Wandering Ascetic Stage – the stage of renunciation 
and withdrawal from the world in preparation of death.  
 
Of course, I use the words ‘life of a man’ advisedly; just as the women and the slaves 
were denied citizenship in Greek city states, a life of education, as well as reflection 
was not on offer for women in traditional Hindu society, even though individual 
women like the poet Meera did rebel and pursue a life of education and sanyasa. 
Equally outside of this cycle of life were the lower castes, with the Shudras only able 
to experience the householder stage, with no resources to retire from work and family 
responsibilities. These socio-temporal phases of the good life are also an attempt to 
escape the cycle of death and rebirth (Nirvana) – the treadmill which keeps us tied to 
the materiality of living.  A modern manifestation of this route could be seen to be the 
rise of the self-help industry – the self-improvement market in the U.S. was worth 
more than $9 billion in 2009 and is increasing. Is this however a good life?  As 
Ahmed suggests, where we find the good life ‘teaches us what we value rather than 
simply what is of value’ (p. 13).  
 
A second, more familiar strand of reaching the individual good life is of course that 
proposed by liberal theorists such as Bentham and Mill and most of all by Adam 
Smith. The shared good life (the social good) is the result of the individual pursuing 
of the good life through ‘truck and barter’ in the market. Individual consumption or 
aspirations to it has become the main route to happiness in the contemporary world. 
The Malls of London and Mumbai, of New York and New Delhi suggest that there is 
traction in this understanding of the good life. And yet, of course, Smith’s work is 
more complex than this:  
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‘The poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, 
…finds the cottage of his father too small…, and fancies he should be lodged 
more at his ease in a palace. … It [isn’t until] in the last dregs of life, his body 
wasted with toil and diseases… that he begins at last to find that wealth and 
greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring 
ease of body or tranquility of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys 
(Smith 1982, 181).  
Justice, beneficence and prudence were the virtues that would ensure good life. Social 
happiness is the effect of a ‘natural arising morality’ even though the individual might 
act morally for reasons other than the social good (Busch, 2008; see also Sen, 1984).  
However, given the Indian caste context, what I immediately think of is that while 
tranquillity is a virtue, is it a virtue only for the rich? Can a poor man’s son not be 
ambitious without coming to grief; this sounds very much like the Varna system in 
Hindu philosophy where those who keep their place and show no ambition to leave 
their station will receive their rewards in ‘other ways’. And what about the poor 
woman’s daughter, one might ask? The altruism that is assumed where her labour is 
concerned sits uneasily next to a ‘natural arising morality’, when the double burden of 
work, the non-recognition of labour and the gender segregated nature of work is 
factored in. Marx, of course, approached the good life from a historical materialist 
position – universal in its sweep of history’s unfolding exploitation, class war leading 
to a utopia where, famously, a liberated society of the future would make it  
"possible for me to do one thing to-day and another tomorrow, to hunt in the 
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, 
just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or 
critic" (1947:22).  
Absent here also is a consideration of who will be doing the house chores when Marx 
(or another man) is hunting, fishing, shepherding or critiquing.  
 
So, to secure the good life for all, I return to the discussion of depletion above, and 
examine both individual and collective strategies to reverse it (Rai et al, 2014). The 
first strategy is that of mitigation, which includes paying others to do tasks such as 
childcare and cleaning with low wages and long hours of work, using labour saving 
appliances and buying convenience foods. This is thus not a shared vision of the good 
life – buying others’ labour to mitigate one’s own, to be in a relationship of 
14 
 
exploitation -low wages and long hours of work - with another cannot contribute to 
the quality of life of all. In the context of global care chains, histories of empire 
remain present in the exploitation of care labour and the ruination of habitats left 
behind the migrant worker (Michel and Peng, 2012; Mahon and Robinson, 2011; Safri 
and Graham, 2010).  
 
A second way of reversing depletion is what we call replenishment, where the state or 
private bodies and voluntary associations contribute to lessen the effects of depletion 
without necessarily recognising it as harmful in the ways that we have outlined. Much 
of the feminist social policy debates on care focus on this aspect – how to mobilize 
state resources that are fiscal, discursive and policy oriented in order to address care 
gaps , gender symmetries (Gornick and Meyers, 2009) and what Fraser has called the 
shift to a ‘universal caregiver’ model (1994). Collective struggles for consolidating 
and expanding social protection and community networks are important aspects of 
political action that can contribute to an understanding of and strategy towards 
bringing about a shared good life for all.   
 
The third way to reverse depletion we term transformation, which involves structural 
change - first in transforming gendered social relations such that both men and 
women equally share social reproductive responsibilities – as Fraser has posited we 
must ‘end gender as we know it’! (1994:611), with social provisions made to reflect 
this. Again, issues of difference, location and subjectivity are important here (Orloff, 
2009) as is reflecting on what a gendered good life might entail in terms of 
redistribution of care responsibilities. And second, the recognition and valuation of 
social reproduction and therefore of depletion. This is not to put monetary but social 
value on how we treat care work that gives carers significance and recognition as 
contributors to a good life for all. If they are to be successful, both these 
transformative arenas need strategies that cut across private/public, North/South 
divides.  
 
Struggles for transforming both these arenas have been ongoing and have seen some 
successes – formal and informal, legal, constitutional and discursive – but as yet these 
successes have not led to systemic transformations. However, if we see successful 
transformation not as a single revolutionary event but as a bundle of changes that may 
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add up to transformation in the long term, then we may see some elements of that 
bundle emerging through these struggles for gender equality and the valuation of 
social reproduction (Rai et al 2014). 
 
 
IV 
Securing the good life 
A tragedy cannot be written about creatures of the jungle, only about those who try to 
get out of it – or those who succumb to it knowing that it is possible to transform it 
 Alan Silitoe, The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists 
 
Thinking about these individual and collective strategies to the good life also makes 
me think about what secures these. Despite our critiques of government, governance 
and the law, contemporary struggles to attain equality, non-discrimination and 
democratic parity have been focused on these institutions. According to Ostrom, ‘The 
concept of a civil society outside of a governed society is difficult for me to accept. It 
seems to me that the problem of achieving a good society is not to move outside of 
government’ (2007). In democratic politics recognition, redistribution and 
development of capabilities of citizens are connected to fair representation, holding 
the state and governance institutions accountable and improving delivery mechanisms 
for policies directed towards achieving these goals. Anne Phillips points out that the 
“persistent under-representation of women in most of the forums in which…issues [of 
public life] are addressed then emerges as a particularly pressing problem’. It is 
pressing because different notions of the good life find particular articulations, and 
these articulations are represented in public life – institutional and informal - in 
different modes, with different outcomes. It is also pressing because institutional 
exclusions don’t result in an inclusive social politics. The evidence across the world 
suggests that a significant increase in representation of women’s and other 
marginalised groups will need special state supported measures such as quotas, as 
necessary if not a sufficient measure to increase participation in public life (Dahlerup, 
2006).  
 
In order to support a shared good life, however, the link between access to power 
structures, participation in decision-making and achieving a gender balance between 
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men and women in political institutions needs to be made and struggled over in the 
context of the political economy in which these institutions are embedded – neoliberal 
smart economics, which promote casualization, flexibilisation and low wages, cannot 
underpin movement towards a gendered good life (Hawkesworth 2006). Without such 
political economy analysis of democratic institutional membership and political 
participation, we risk depoliticisation of gender sensitive policy-making. 
Depoliticisation can also take the form of neglecting the link feminists have sought to 
establish – between private and the public, between the governance of polities and 
governance of communities. This is important because the two often work together 
powerfully through the imbricated nature of state and non-state governance 
mechanisms that shape both formal citizenship and the informality of belonging to 
communities both of which affect how subjectivity and agency are supported as well 
as constrained (Baxi, et al, 2006; Madhok and Rai, 2012).  
 
Finally, securing the good life in terms of recognition and redistribution also means 
paying attention to difference. Reflexive analysis of the erasures of race and culture in 
the stories of feminist theory are made possible through a series of ontological and 
epistemological manoeuvres, which structure the emergence of a "common sense" 
regarding the boundaries of the known and knowable and make alliances across these 
boundaries difficult (Hemmings, 2011). In terms of social policy, Orloff asks ‘who 
will be entitled to …new social protections and services?’ (2009:141); as we have 
seen in the context of debates on depletion above, the language of citizenship includes 
as well as excludes. Fraser resolved the recognition/redistribution conflict through her 
Weberian formulation of institutionalized parity of participation; I argue instead that 
in addition, a more political approach is needed that addresses the need for new 
solidarities for change. This of course is not easy. From working class women’s and 
black feminist challenges to ‘global feminism’ in the 1970s, to the ‘cultural’ 
difference debates of the 1980s, difference had vexed feminist theory and practice in 
productive and less fruitful ways. While the earlier optimistic readings of women’s 
solidarity had folded in differences among them, many have argued that the cultural 
turn of the 1990s led to a cultural essentialism on the one hand (Narayan, 1998) and a 
‘hands off’ approach to otherness which meant that most dialogue across cultural 
boundaries ceased to animate feminist work. I can vouch for this hesitancy that 
emerges from a feeling of being always in the ‘wrong place’ or the perpetual state of 
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otherness. When writing or speaking of ‘honour crimes’ in India and Pakistan for 
example, I have felt worried about the reading my work will generate in those outside 
the cultural boundaries within which this crime takes place, while at the same time 
recognising the importance of breaking the codes of silence that racism imposes, 
something that most people of colour experience. As Geeta Chowdhury and I have 
argued, we have not yet been able to develop the vocabularies that would allow us to 
speak confidently and respectfully across these borders of difference (2009). And yet 
reimagining the good life and struggling to make it real needs precisely that – a new 
politics of solidarity.  
 
IV 
Solidarity 
… we might even say that the quest for the good life is the quest for the right form of 
politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lay within the realm of what can be 
achieved today. (Adorno, 2000:176). 
 
We have seen above that the struggle for the good life takes both individual and 
collective forms. Trade unions, mobilising memberships in defence of their rights, 
insurgent citizens challenging inequalities of recognition and of redistribution of 
national resources, global social movements campaigning on issues that cannot be 
resolved within national boundaries – all these have contributed to conceiving of, 
articulating and working to bring into being the good life. 
 
Bloch argued that Utopia was a form of ‘cultural surplus’ - in the world, but not of it: 
‘it contains the spark that reaches out beyond the surrounding emptiness,’ (in Giroux, 
1986b: 249). Lighting the spark and making social transformations happen involves 
agency – both as resistance and as solidarity. However, exercising agency also attracts 
risks, especially as Rahel Jaeggi suggests, in conditions of ‘a deficit of social 
cooperation that can result in a situation of 'social alienation' (2001: 288). Sumi 
Madhok and I have argued that mobilising, exercising or framing agency, must be 
informed by a mapping of power relations as it alerts us to the levels of risk involved 
in exercising agency in a political landscape where political power is manifest as well 
as hidden, disciplining as well as disruptive (2010). This is to counter the tendency to 
view agency as an attribute of the individual who, in the words of Wendy Brown 
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‘…bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or her action, no matter how 
severe the constraints on this action…’ (Brown 2003:np). Struggles for change do not 
unfold in individualist, ahistorical, universalist and acontextual frames; they do so in 
specific contexts, in languages that are laden with histories and through agency that is 
framed by risks.  While not acting might prolong social injury, strategizing for change 
needs to involve attention to the parameters of power within which agential subjects 
seek to act. Here also, as we have seen above in the context of the debate on depletion 
and care, the good life cannot be realised if the costs of its realisation are too high for 
too many; after all, we don’t want to be thinking about tragedies but positive 
outcomes. Solidarity can be a defence against such costs.  
 
For Durkheim, solidarity was what prevents the breakdown of societies; for Marx it 
was class reflexivity translated into political action against exploitation; for feminists 
it has been at times ‘global sisterhood’ and at others solidarity in difference. Solidarity 
has also been visualised as one standing for the others and the others standing in for 
one – as a form of coordinated action (Einwohner et al, 2016). Solidarity is not 
beneficence or charity, I would argue; it is a more symmetrical relationship among 
those whose vision of a good life coalesce around similar forms of politics. It militates 
against, what Giroux calls, ‘the sheer weight of apocalypse’ (1986b: 247). Take for 
example the slut walks as a campaign to challenge the denial of public spaces to 
women, or the Why Loiter? Campaign which is doing the same for women in India 
(Khan et al 2011). Both can be criticised for their white and middle class composition, 
but even in this critique they provide us with questions that we need to address to 
build networks of solidarity-in-action (Mercier, 2017). Solidarity is reflexive: it 
illuminates practices of power at work within different discursive and institutional 
relations of domination but it also critiques itself as a particular type of practice in 
which men and women challenge oppressive and dominating institutions (Giroux, 
ibid. 251). According to Sharon D Welch solidarity is the opposite of indifference: 
‘To remember the reality of oppression in the lives of people and to value those lives 
is to be saved from the luxury of hopelessness’ (1985:90). 
 
Solidarity then ties people together – it binds, but if it is reflexive, it does so 
capaciously and sensitively. Even as the individual strategies of leaving violent 
worlds behind makes refugees in Europe vulnerable to new violent words of hate and 
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rejection, we need to think what solidarity might for us all. After all, although there 
have been many who have waved flags that say, in the words of the poet Wasran 
Shire: 
go home blacks 
refugees 
dirty immigrants 
asylum seekers 
sucking our country dry (2015) 
there have also been many who have given the arriving refugees bread and water, 
warmth and support – solidarity in short. In these acts of solidarity we can also see 
how Marx thought (in unfeminist vocabulary) of  the ‘species being’ - that each 
human being must, by virtue of being human, imagine ‘himself’/herself as the 
example of being human. Through developing such a reflexive solidarity, through 
standing with others in struggle defined by historical processes to develop concrete 
forms of sociality, we can develop what Welch calls a ‘redeemed community’. This 
capacious solidarity can let us come together and generate a liminal moments of 
change, even though we later go our own ways – Spivak’s notion of strategic 
essentialism (1987) – not just as a mobilizational device but also alerting us to the 
dangers of doing so - can guide us here to build bridges to cross to a shared end. 
Solidarity with others can then help us towards a good life for ourselves.  
 
We, as intellectuals, educators can participate in developing this solidarity – we can 
do this through reflecting on our curricula, our pedagogy, our writing and the spaces 
we are ready to occupy. bell hooks called for “renewal and rejuvenation in our 
teaching practices […] so that we can create new visions, [through] a movement 
which makes education the practice of freedom” (1994: 12).  So, when a group of 
academics from the University of East London teach refugees in Calais even as the 
camp there is dismantled by the French government; or when professors from 
different disciplines and countries conduct ‘teach-ins’ at Jawaharlal University 
challenging the appropriation of nationalism by the current right-wing government, in 
support of the student movement, such acts of everyday solidarity help bridge the 
private and public, the individual and the collective and challenge the dichotomies of 
knowledge/power. By ‘uncovering forms of historical and subjugated knowledges that 
point to experiences of suffering, conflict, and collective struggle… teachers as 
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intellectuals can begin to link the notion of historical understanding to elements of 
critique and hope’ (Giroux, 1986b:254). In doing so, we place ourselves in relation to 
the social that we critique, the individual that we nurture in our classrooms, and the 
political that we seek to change.  
  
   
21 
 
References 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. Problems of Moral Philosophy, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000  
Adorno, Theodor, 1974, Minima Moralia, Reflections on a Damaged Life, 
London: Verso 
Ahmed Sara, 2010, Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects), 
http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm  
Ambedkar, B R, 2014, Annihilation of Caste, London: Verso 
Appadurai, A., 2004, 'The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of 
Recognition', in Rao, V. and Walton, M., (eds.) Culture and Public Action, Stanford 
University Press, Palo Alto, California, pp 59-84. 
Arendt, Hannah, 1977, Eichmann in Jerusalem, London: Penguin Books 
Barrett, Michelle, 2014. Women's oppression today: The Marxist/feminist 
encounter, London: Verso Books 
Baxi, Upendra, Vasudha Dhagamwar, Raghunath Kelkar and Lotika Sarkar, 
1979, AN OPEN LETTER TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA, 
http://pldindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Open-Letter-to-CJI-in-the-Mathura-
Rape-Case.pdf  
Bhagwati Jagdish and Arvind Panagariya 2014, Why Growth Matters: How 
Economic Growth in India Reduced Poverty and the Lessons for Other Developing 
Countries  New York: PublicAffairs 
Brown, W., ‘Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’, Theory & 
Event, v.7, n.1, 2003 
Busch, Michael, 2008, Adam Smith and Consumerism’s Role in Happiness: 
Modern Society Re-examined Major Themes in Economics, Spring  pp 65-77 
Butler Judith Can One Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life? Adorno Prize Lecture, 
Radical Philosophy 176 (Nov/Dec 2012) / Article 
https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/can-one-lead-a-good-life-in-a-bad-life 
Butler, Judith (1997c) ‘Merely Cultural’, Social Text 52/53 15(3-4): 265-277  
Chowdhry, Geeta and Shirin M Rai, 2009, The Geographies of Exclusion and 
the Politics of Inclusion, International Studies Perspectives 10, 84–91. 
Cooper, Davina, 2014, Everyday Utopias, London: Duke University Press 
Dahlerup, Drude, 2006, Women, Quotas and Politics (ed), London: Routledge 
22 
 
Einwohner, Rachel L. Kaitlin Kelly-Thompson, Valeria Sinclair-Chapman, 
Mangala Subramanian, Fernando Tormos, S. Laurel Weldon, Jared M. Wright, and 
Charles Wu, 2016, ACTIVE SOLIDARITY: STRATEGIES FOR 
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL COOPERATION IN CONTEXTS OF 
DIFFERENCE, DOMINATION AND DISTRUST, unpublished paper 
Elson, D. 2000. ‘The Progress of Women: Empowerment and Economics’, in 
The Progress of the World’s Women. New York: UNIFEM. 
Elson, Diane and Ruth Pearson (1984), 'The Subordination of Women and the 
Internationalization of Factory Production', in K. Young, et al. (eds), Of Marriage and 
the Market: Women's Subordination in International Perspective, (London: 
Routledge)  
Engels, Fredrich, 1884, Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State; 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/origin_family.pdf  
Fraser, Nancy (1994). "After the Family Wage: Gender Equality and the 
Welfare State," Political Theory, 22(4): 591-618.  
Fraser, Nancy 1995, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice 
in a 'Post-Socialist' Age. NLR I/212, July-August  pp. 68-93  
Fraser, Nancy Axel Honneth, 2003. Redistribution Or Recognition?: A 
Political-philosophical Exchange, London: Verso 
Giroux , Henry A. (1986b): Solidarity, Struggle, and the Discourse of Hope: 
Theory, Practice, and Experience in Radical Education, Part II, The Review of 
Education, 12:4, 247-255 
Gornick Janet C and Marcia K Meyers 2009, An Institutional Proposal, in 
Gender Equality: Transforming Family Divisions of Labour, Janet C Gornick and 
Marcia K Meyers eds. London Verso 
Hassim, Shireen, 2009, ‘Whose Utopia’ in Gender Equality: Transforming 
Family Divisions of Labour, Janet C Gornick and Marcia K Meyers eds. 
Hawkesworth, M. (2006) ‘Feminists v. Feminization: Confronting the War 
Logics of the Bush Administration’, Asteriskos 1/2: 117–42 
Hemmings, Clare 2011. Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of 
Feminist Theory, Duke University Press 
Hooks, Bell, 1994, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of 
Freedom; London: Routledge 
23 
 
Jaeggi, Rahel, SOLIDARlTY AND INDIFFERENCE, 2001, in Ruud ter 
Meulen Ph.D., Wil Arts Ph.D., Ruud Muffels  (eds) Solidarity in Health and Social 
Care in Europe, Kluwer Academic 
Kannabirān, Kalpana and Ritu Menon, 2007, From Mathura to Manorama: 
Resisting Violence Against Women in India, New Delhi: Women Unlimited 
Kaviraj Sudipta, 1986, Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics, Economic and 
Political Weekly Vol. 21, No. 38/39 (Sep. 20-27,), pp. 1697-1708; 
Khan, Sameera Shilpa Ranade Shilpa Phadke, 2011, Why Loiter?: Women 
And Risk On Mumbai Streets, New Delhi: Penguin Books 
Kohli, Atul, 2012, Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Madhok Sumi and Shirin M. Rai (2012), Agency, Injury, and Transgressive 
Politics in Neoliberal Times, Signs, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Spring pp. 645-669 
Mahon, Rianne and Fiona Robinson, 2011, Feminist Ethics and Social Policy 
2011, Toronto UBC Press 
Marx K. and F. Engels, The German Ideology [1845-46; repub. New York: 
International Publishers, 1947], p. 22.  
Mercier, Elisabeth, 2017, Pop Feminism, Sex-Positive Activism, and the 
Polemics Surrounding the SlutWalk, Paper presented at ECPG Conference, Lausanne.  
Michel, Sonya and Ito Peng, 2012, All in the family? Migrants, nationhood, 
and care regimes in Asia and North America, Journal of European Social Policy, 
22(4) 406–418 
Mies, Maria, 2014, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in 
the International Division of Labour, London: Zed Books 
Miller, Fred, 2017, Aristotle's Political Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ 
Mohanty Chandra Talpade, 2003, “Under Western Eyes” Revisited: Feminist 
Solidarity through Anticapitalist Struggles, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society Volume 28, Number 2, pp. 499-535 
Narayan Uma, 1998, Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A Feminist 
Critique of Cultural Essentialism, Hypatia, Vol. 13, No. 2 
Nussbaum Martha and Amartya Sen, 1993, The Quality of Life Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
24 
 
Orloff, Ann Shola, Should Feminists Aim for Gender Symmetry? in Gender 
Equality: Transforming Family Divisions of Labour, Janet C Gornick and Marcia K 
Meyers eds. 
Ostrom, Elinor Covenanting, Co-Producing, and the Good Society, The 
Newsletter of PEGS, 1993 
Pateman, Carol, 1988, The Sexual Contract, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press 
Pettman, JJ., ‘International sex and service’ in: Kofman E., Youngs G. (eds.) 
Globalisation: Theory and Practice, London, Continuum, 2003 
Rai, Shirin M, Catherine Hoskyns and Dania Thomas, 2014, Depletion: The 
Cost of Social Reproduction, International Feminist Journal of Politics Volume 16, 
Issue 1 Pages 86-105 
Safri M, Graham J., The global household: toward a feminist postcapitalist 
international political economy. Signs, 36(1) 99-126 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy, Death Without Weeping, London: University of 
California Press 
Sen, Amartya, 1990, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, 
DECEMBER 20, New York Review of Books 
Shire, Warsan “Home” SEPTEMBER 2, 2015, 
http://seekershub.org/blog/2015/09/home-warsan-shire/ 
Spivak, Gayatri C. 1987. In other worlds: Essays in cultural politics. New 
York: Routledge. 
Watson, Matthew, 2005 Foundations of International Political Economy, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Weil Simone, ‘Human Personality’, in Miles, Sian (ed.), Simone Weil: An 
Anthology, London, Penguin Books, 2005 
 
 
 
